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Riaz Khokhar, 
Visi ng Fellow at the  
East‐West Center in 
Washington explains 
that “Un l the 
Afghanistan issue is 
resolved, chances are 
slim that the United 
States will think of 
Pakistan in a broader 
Asian framework.” 
The United States has not reoriented its Pakistan strategy away from a solely Afghanistan‐Pakistan basis 
toward a wider Indo‐Pacific perspec ve. Even so, a significantly posi ve transforma on in Islamabad’s 
domes c environment and foreign rela ons can change the U.S. and interna onal perspec ves about 
Pakistan. 
For starters, there is a strong percep on in Washington policymaking circles that un l the Afghanistan 
issue is resolved, chances are slim that the United States will think of Pakistan in a broader Asian 
framework. Even the resolu on of the Afghanistan conundrum would not guarantee an improved U.S.‐
Pakistan rela onship. Although Islamabad’s suppor ve role in the ongoing U.S.‐Taliban peace talks is 
appreciable, there is palpable frustra on in the U.S. Department of Defense regarding Pakistan’s alleged 
patronage of terrorist groups that have killed U.S. troops in Afghanistan. 
There is also skep cism about the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan because Washington has not yet achieved 
its primary objec ves. These include but are not limited to breaking the nexus between regional and 
interna onal terrorist groups; augmen ng the capacity of Afghan na onal security forces; and, elimina ng 
the possibility of Afghanistan as a launching pad of terrorism in the United States or its allied countries. 
Hence, the unaccomplished objec ves make it less likely that the U.S. troops will leave any me soon. 
In the context of a wider Asian region, the U.S. Na onal Security Strategy of 2017 designated China as a 
primary strategic rival and downgraded terrorism to a secondary level threat. Thus, although the United 
States will retain some form of presence in Afghanistan for stability and counter‐terrorism measures, most 
of its military, economic, and diploma c capital will be directed toward the strategic compe on with 
China and Russia. 
So, as far as Afghanistan and counter‐terrorism issues are concerned, Pakistan has vital importance for the 
United States. But beyond Afghanistan, whether that means economic engagement or resump on of 
military aid and assistance, Washington has nothing in store for Islamabad. 
In fact, with reference to the China‐Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), some U.S. government officials 
have stated that it is also in the U.S. interest that Beijing is contribu ng to Islamabad’s economic 
development. However, they have also expressed some concerns regarding the opaque nature of the 
Chinese loans and the extent to which Pakistan is providing China with access to its land and resources. 
These factors may make Islamabad more subservient to Chinese interests in the region and may dissuade 
Washington from considering Pakistan as a partner or even nonaligned in the U.S. strategic rivalry with 
Beijing.  
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So, is Washington considering an offse ng strategy to reduce China’s influence in Pakistan? Not really. 
Even if it were, there is a percep on in academia and the think tank community in Washington that the 
United States will not be able to reduce China’s influence in Pakistan. Does that mean that Islamabad does 
not factor in the U.S. strategy beyond Afghanistan? Not at the moment. 
Although the primary thrust of the U.S. Indo‐Pacific strategy is Southeast and Northeast Asia, it would be 
useful if Washington engages with and invests in some other countries, which do not want to rely solely on 
Beijing and seek to bring balance in their rela onships with both the United States and China. In this 
regard, the United States has enacted the Be er U liza on of Investment Leading toward Development 
(BUILD) Act, which may be implemented in the la er end of the year 2019. Under the Act, the U.S. State 
Department encourages private companies by guaranteeing investment insurances in less developed or 
developing countries. Apart from that, Japan has already been inves ng in infrastructure and energy 
domains in various countries, including Pakistan, as part of its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) 
ini a ve, which serves as both a commercial vision and an alterna ve to the Chinese Belt and Road 
projects.  
This is a great opportunity for Pakistan if the government is serious about a rac ng foreign direct 
investment. The consensus in Washington is that the Pakistani state is responsible for a rac ng 
investment, for which it needs to improve its business climate, economic governance, and most 
importantly its security environment. Foreign companies consider it too risky a proposi on to invest in a 
country which is grey‐listed by the Financial Ac on Task Force (FATF) — an interna onal finance oversight 
organiza on — or which is ranked poorly (136/190) in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index. 
As for the U.S.‐China strategic compe on, if Pakistan wants to remain nonaligned and not be seen as 
under China’s influence, there are a few  steps that Islamabad  can take.  First, it should ask the World 
Bank to offer a technical assessment of its CPEC projects and the financial implica ons of Chinese long‐
term loans under those projects. Second, since the United States is discouraging its allies and partners 
from buying fi h genera on telecommunica on equipment from the Chinese Huawei network company, 
Pakistan should also voluntarily refuse to purchase the technology.   
Although it is unlikely that Islamabad will take these types of ac ons, such steps would send a strong signal 
to the White House and the Capitol Hill that Pakistan is not en rely under China’s influence and that it is 
making extraordinary efforts to improve rela ons with the United States. This could be a stepping stone to 
enhancing U.S.‐Pakistan rela ons in mul ple poten al areas of coopera on in the Indo‐Pacific region. 
In sum, the current U.S. administra on does not priori ze expanding rela ons with Pakistan beyond 
Afghanistan. Even if it did, Pakistan’s domes c economic slump and the hangover of the blame of 
terrorism‐sponsoring ac vi es in the region do not offer enough incen ves to American and interna onal 
businesses to invest in the country beyond marginal levels. Above all, most of Pakistan’s foreign rela ons 
and policies stand at great odds with the U.S. strategic interests. This divergence keeps the rela onship at 
a tac cal level, not on a long‐term or strategic trajectory. This makes the prospects of U.S.‐Pakistan 
rela ons pivo ng from “AFPAK” to the “Indo‐Pacific” slim. 
"The consensus in 
Washington is that the 
Pakistani state is 
responsible for a rac ng 
investment, for which it 
needs to improve its 
business climate, 
economic governance, 
and most importantly its 
security environment." 
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